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1. The Value Group, Inc. v. Mendham Lake Estates, 800 F.
Supp. 1228, 1231 (D.N.J., 1992) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) and (b)
(West Supp. 1992)). The 1990 act added the category "architectural
work", and for the first time gave such works full copyright protec-
tion under the law.
2. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1992).
3. The Value Group, Inc. v. Mendham Lake Estates, 800 F.
Supp. at 1231.
4. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 107-120).
5. Id. at 1231-32 (citing 17 U.S.C. % 501, 502).
6. The court also identified as one factor for consideration
the possibility of harm to the infringer by granting the injunction
but later refused to consider a balancing of hardships as determina-
tive. Id. at 1231 (citing Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent
Opticians of America, 820 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990)).
7. Id. at 1232 (citing In re Arthur Treacher's Franchise
Litigation, 689 F.2d 1137, 1147 (3d Cir. 1982)).
8. Id. (citing Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546
F. Supp. 125, 128 (D.N.J. 1982)).
9. Id. (citing Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546
F. Supp. at 139).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1232 (citing Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., -U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991)).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing Franklin Mint Corp. v National Wildlife Art
Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 64 (3d Cir. 1973)).
15. See Id. at 1233.M6. 17 u.s.C. § 101 (1988).
17. The Value Group, Inc. v. Mendham Lake Estates, 800 F.
Supp. at 1233; See also Id. at n.7 (noting Mendham Lake's own
sales brochure encouraged buyers to obtain competitors designs in
order to copy them).
18. Id. at 1233 (citing Robert R. Associates, Inc. v. Nino
Homes, 686 F. Supp. 160, 162 (E.D. Mich. 1987)).
19. Id. (citing Midway Mfg. v. Vandai-America, Inc., 546 F.
Supp. at 138).
20. See Id. at 1234.
21. See Id.
22. See Id.
23. See Id.24. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
25. The Value Group, Inc. v. Mendham Lake Estates, 800 R.
Supp. at 1235.
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. and
Tracy-Locke, Inc.
978 F2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
INTRODUCTION
Following a radio commercial broadcast imitating
his voice, Tom Waits, a professional singer and song-
writer, sued Frito-Lay, Inc. and Tracy-Locke, Inc. for
voice misappropriation under California tort law and
false endorsement under the Lanham Act. The United
States District Court for the Central District of
California returned a jury verdict for Waits in the
amount of $2.6 million. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found Waits' voice mis-
appropriation and Lanham Act claims to be legally
sufficient. However, in considering Waits' damage
award, the court found that the damages awarded
under the Lanham Act claim were duplicative of those
awarded under Waits' claim for voice misappropria-
tion.
FACTS
Tom Waits is a well-known professional singer
and songwriter with a very distinctive raspy singing
voice. Although Waits has achieved both commercial
and critical success in his musical career, he has pub-
licly expressed his philosophy that musical artists
should not perform commercials since it detracts from
their artistic integrity. Waits has openly maintained
this policy for the last ten years and has rejected
offers to endorse major products.
Frito-Lay, Inc., a snack food manufacturer, and its
advertising agency, Tracy-Locke, Inc., began an
advertising campaign to introduce Frito-Lay's new
product, SalsaRio Doritos. Inspired by Waits' 1976
song "Step Right Up", the ad agency created a radio
commercial which "echoed the rhyming word play"
of Waits' song. During Tracy-Locke's presentation of
the SalsaRio campaign to Frito-Lay, a preliminary ren-
dition of the commercial was sung followed by a
recording of Waits' version of the song in order to
emphasize that the commercial would generate the
same overall feeling as the Waits' song.
In auditioning singers for the commercial, Tracy-
Locke intentionally sought a singer who could imitate
Waits' voice and style. The position was filled by
Stephen Carter, a professional musician and a Tom
Waits fan who consciously perfected his voice over a
ten year period to be an imitation of Waits' voice.
In September and October of 1988, the commer-
cial was broadcast over 250 radio stations throughout
the country. Upon hearing the commercial, Waits real-
ized that listeners would assume the voice was his
and believe Waits had agreed to do a commercial for
Doritos.
In finding in favor of Waits, a jury awarded the
singer $374,000 compensatory damages, $2 million
punitive damages for voice misappropriation and
$100,000 damages for violation of the Lanham Act.
The court also awarded Waits attorneys' fees under
the Lanham Act.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Waits filed suit against the defendants claiming
voice misappropriation under California tort law and
false endorsement under section 43(a) of the federal
Lanham Act. In determining Waits' state tort claim, the
Ninth Circuit considered: (1) whether the California
tort for voice misappropriation was still good law; (2)
the proper elements contained in a tort of voice mis-
appropriation; and (3) whether or not certain types of
compensatory and punitive damages are applicable to
the tort of voice misappropriation. In considering
Waits' false endorsement claim under the Lanham Act,
the appellate court reviewed Waits standing and the
issue of damages. In arguing that Waits did not have
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a tort claim for voice misappropriation, first the defen-
dants contended that Midler v. Ford Motor Company,
which articulates California's law on voice misappro-
priation, was implicitly overruled by the Supreme
Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc.' Next, the defendants argued that the federal
Copyright Act preempts the California tort of voice
misappropriation.
In Midler, the Ninth Circuit held that when a dis-
tinctive voice of a widely known professional singer
is deliberately copied to sell commercial products, a
tort is committed. This so-called Midler tort is defined
by the Ninth Circuit as a specific violation of the right
of publicity. Specifically, the violation is to the right of
the celebrity to control the commercial use of his or
her identity.3 If a voice is a sufficient indicator of a
celebrity's identity, the right of publicity will protect
him or her against an unauthorized imitation of his or
her voice for commercial purposes.'
The defendants contended that Bonito Boats
impliedly overruled Midler because the Supreme
Court in Bonito Boats held that state law is preempted
by federal patent law which expressly does not pro-
tect "publicly known design and utilitarian ideas".' In
analyzing the defendants' argument, the court rejected
their reliance on earlier case law denying an enter-
tainers' challenges to imitations of their performances
based on federal copyright exemption.6 The court
found that Bonito Boats cautioned against reading
these earlier cases to broadly for a preemption princi-
ple, and itself cited subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions narrowing the broad interpretation of the pre-
emption principle.7 In rejecting the defendants' argu-
ment, the appellate court found that Bonito Boats
reaffirmed the right of states to place limited regula-
tion on the use of unpatented designs to prevent con-
sumer confusion.8 Moreover, the Supreme Court in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. recog-
nized the authority of states to protect an entertainer's
right of publicity. Thus, the appellate court found
that Bonito Boats did not impliedly overrule Midler;
rather Bonito Boats stands for a more limited preemp-
tive principle.
Next the defendants argued that Midler should
have been preempted by Section 114 of the Copyright
Act since the subject matter of Midler, voice, is one
that is covered by federal copyright law. Under the
federal Copyright Act, a state cause of action escapes
preemption, "if its subject matter 'does not come
within the subject matter of copyright.., including
works or authorship not fixed in any tangible medium
of expression."", The appellate court again rejected
the defendants' argument and found Midler to be
good law. The court held that voice misappropriation
is not preempted by the Copyright Act because voice,
which does not contain "fixed" sounds, is not copy-
rightable."
Waits' voice misappropriation claim was not pre-
empted by federal copyright law, but was rather one
for the invasion of a personal property right - his
right of publicity to control the use of his voice.'" The
appellate court affirmed that the proper elements of
voice misappropriation, as enunciated in Midler, are:
(1) the defendants had deliberately imitated the plain-
tiffs voice, rather than merely his style; (2) the plain-
tiff's voice was sufficiently distinctive; and (3) the
plaintiffs voice was sufficiently widely known. 13
The defendants next contended that the district
court erred in rejecting their proposed jury instruc-
tions regarding the three elements of the Midler tort.
The defendants argued they did not deliberately imi-
tate Waits' voice. Accordingly, defendants had pro-
posed to instruct the jury in the difference between
voice, which is protected under Midler, and style,
which is not subject to ownership, and thus not pro-
tected." The appellate court declared that, as a whole,
the instructions were not misleading, since the
instruction had indicated .that tort liability can be
established only by imitation of voice, not imitation of
style. The instruction went on to state that the imita-
tion must be so good that a person familiar with
Waits' singing voice would believe it was Waits him-
self singing in the defendants' commercial.
The defendants argued the instructions confused
the "distinctiveness" of a voice with its ability to be
identified or recognized. The instruction defined the
"distinctiveness" of a voice by its characteristics that
identify it with a particular singer. A central element
of a right of publicity is considering the identifiability
of the person through the distinctiveness of the
voice.' 5 The appellate court thus affirmed the instruc-
tion's appropriateness of definition.
The defendants also object to the instruction
regarding the "widely known" element, claiming the
instruction to be too vague to aid the jury in making a
factual determination.6 The defendants argued Waits
is not "well known" under the Midler element since
he has not achieved the same level of stardom as that
of Bette Midler. The appellate court rejected this inter-
pretation as underinclusive since it would exclude
popular singers who have not reached superstardom
but who still deserve legal protection. In declaring
that the term "well known" is relative to the amount
of damages recoverable, the appellate court affirmed
that the "great weight" of the evidence from trial
demonstrates Waits is "very widely known".
The defendants next disputed Waits' compensato-
ry damages award, arguing that a plaintiff in a right of
publicity action can only receive damages to compen-
sate for economic injury. The appellate court, noting
that Midler did not limit damage recovery, recognized
that voice appropriation may cause a celebrity humili-
ation, embarrassment and emotional distress. 7
Defendants objected to this reputational damage
award, arguing that such an award is available only in
defamation claims which Waits did not allege here.
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Even if such damages were available, the defendants
contended that Waits had not proved injury to his
career. The court concluded, however, that the dam-
ages were proper given evidence of Waits' public
position against commercial endorsements, and that
Waits was humiliated by the SalsaRio ad since it made
him appear to be a hypocrite.
Applying the tort principle under California law
that damages are available to compensate for all
injuries caused by a defendant's tortious conduct,'
the appellate court found reputational damages were
proper and had been awarded in previous right of
publicity cases. Therefore, Waits received compen-
satory damages for injury to goodwill and future pub-
licity value, and to compensate him for injury to his
reputation caused by the misappropriation of his
identity.
Regarding the punitive damages award, the defen-
dants asked that this award be vacated, claiming
punitive damages are unavailable as a matter of law,
and in the alternative, that the evidence does not sup-
port the award. 19 The defendants argued that since the
Midler decision was so recent and imprecise in scope,
they could not have been aware of the rights they
were infringing upon and thus they were not in "con-
scious disregard" of Waits' property rights. However,
the appellate court affirmed the award of punitive
damages since there was a "high probability" that
Frito-Lay and Tracy-Locke consciously disregarded
Waits' rights when they decided to broadcast the imi-
tation of Waits' voice, rather than utilizing another
version of the commercial which they had prepared
in fear of litigation. Thus, the punitive damage award
was affirmed.
Defendants' next series of arguments on appeal
were concerning Waits' Lanham Act claim. First, the
appellate court dealt with the issue of whether false
endorsement claims were cognizable under the Act.20
Upon analyzing the legislative history,21 the court clar-
ified that Congress intended the terms "symbol or
device" to include distinctive sounds", and concluded
that false endorsement claims, including those unau-
thorized imitation of a celebrity's distinctive voice, are
cognizable under 43(a) of the Act.
Defendants next contended that Waits lacked
standing to bring a claim under the Lanham Act
because he is not in competition with the defendants.
The court recognized that Ninth Circuit precedent on
this issue was in conflict and attempted to reconcile
the two leading cases on each side. In Smith v.
Montoro, the Ninth Circuit ruled that a plaintiff need
not be a competitor in order to have standing.2 3
However, in Halicki v. United Artists Communica-
tions, Inc., the Ninth Circuit asserted that to have
standing, a plaintiff must be a competitor in order to
establish economic injury.24 The court distinguished
the two cases since each involved different prongs of
liability under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Smith
was premised on a claim of false designation of ori-
gin; whereas, the plaintiff in Halicki asserted a false
advertising cause of action.
Under Smith, the Lanham Act allows a claim for
noncompetitors who were commercially injured by
the "deceptive and misleading use of marks"."
Applying Smith to the case at bar, the court held that
"a celebrity whose endorsement of a product is
implied through the imitation of a distinctive attribute
of the celebrity's identity, has standing to sue for false
endorsement under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act".26 The court concluded Waits, although not a
competitor in the traditional sense, has standing since
it was likely that he would be commercially injured
by the wrongful use of his professional trademark -
his unique voice.
Defendants also alleged that Waits' false endorse-
ment claim under the Lanham Act should fail on its
merits because the commercial does not show that
Waits sponsored or endorsed the Frito-Lay product.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act "prohibits the use of
false designations of origin, false descriptions and
false representations in the advertising and sale of
goods and services".27 Waits' false endorsement claim
is with merit, since the jury not only listened to a
number of Waits' own recordings and then to the
SalsaRio commercial, but the jury also heard evidence
regarding the likelihood of consumer confusion since
the targeted group of the commercial was male radio-
listeners ages 18-35, a group which would also be
familiar with Waits. Thus, there was sufficient evi-
dence to support the jury's finding that the commer-
cial wrongly led consumers to believe that Waits'
endorsed the Frito-Lay product.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit Appellate Court found that
when voice is a sufficient indicator of a celebrity's
identity, the right of publicity protects against its imi-
tation for commercial purposes without the celebrity's
consent. This right is protected in California under
state tort law. Under the federal Lanham Act, celebrity
singers have standing to sue for voice misappropria-
tion because of the likelihood that wrongful use of
their professional trademark-their voices-would
injure them commercially.
Linda M. Cecchin
1. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, -U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 1513, 1514 (1992)).
2. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141 (1989).
3. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.
1992), (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d at 463).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1099 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 152 (the Supreme Court invalidated a
Florida statute that gave perpetual patent-like protection to boat
hull designs that were expressly excluded from federal patent pro-
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